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      OPINION                
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 In this appeal, we are asked to decide whether the 
district court erred: (1) in ruling that eight firearm counts in 
the indictment formed five separate groups under U.S.S.G. § 
3D1.2, instead of a single group; and (2) when, in sentencing the 
defendant under the more favorable 1990 sentencing guidelines, it 
failed to accord the defendant an additional point for acceptance 
of responsibility as is permitted under § 3E1.1 pursuant to the 
1993 sentencing guidelines.  Because we conclude that the 
district court did not err in applying and interpreting the 
Sentencing Guidelines, we will affirm the sentence of appellant 
in all respects.  
 
 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 Between May 22, 1989 and June 26, 1991, appellant 
Gregory Griswold ("Griswold") purchased seven firearms from a 
licensed firearms dealer in Philadelphia.  Specifically, he 
purchased two firearms on May 22, 1989, two more on August 8, 
1989, and one each on October 6, 1989, March 4, 1991, and June 
26, 1991.  On the first three occasions, Griswold used the 
fictitious name of "Julius H. Collier, Jr."  The last two times 
he used the name "Robert Saunders."  For each firearm, he 
completed the standard "Firearms Transaction Record" of the 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms.  On the form, he 
  
misrepresented that he had never been convicted in any court of a 
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, 
when, in fact, he had previously been convicted of third degree 
homicide.  On July 11, 1991, Philadelphia Police Officers, while 
executing a search warrant at a residence in Philadelphia, found 
Griswold in possession of two of the illegally purchased 
firearms.   
 On February 23, 1994,1 a federal grand jury in the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania returned an indictment charging 
Griswold with seven counts of making false statements to a 
licensed dealer in connection with the acquisition of a firearm, 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), and one count of unlawful 
possession of firearms by a previously convicted felon, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).2  Griswold entered into a 
                     
1
.  The delay between the initial arrest and the indictment of 
Griswold was due to the fact that he remained a fugitive for more 
than two years. 
2
.  The indictment charged Griswold as follows: 
 
COUNT DATE OF 
OFFENSE 
FIREARM ALIAS USED OFFENSE 
One 5-22-89 Intratec 
9mm. semi-
auto 
Julius 
Collier, 
Jr. 
False 
statement 
Two 5-22-89 Colt .380 
semi-auto 
Julius 
Collier, 
Jr. 
False 
statement 
Three 8-8-89 Sig Sauer 
.380 semi-
auto 
Julius 
Collier, 
Jr.  
False 
statement 
Four 8-8-89 Colt .380 
semi-auto 
Julius 
Collier, 
Jr. 
False 
statement 
  
plea agreement with the government and on May 16, 1994, he 
entered a plea of guilty to all eight counts.  The plea agreement 
contained several stipulations relevant to the computation of 
Griswold's sentencing guideline range.  Because the Commission 
had amended § 2K2.1 after Griswold committed the charged 
offenses, the 1993 version would have resulted in a harsher 
sentence than the version in effect when he committed the 
offenses, raising a possible ex post facto challenge.  Both 
parties agreed that the version of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 effective 
November 1, 1990 was the applicable guideline for determining the 
offense level of the firearms offenses.3  The parties further 
(..continued) 
Five 10-6-89 Beretta 
.380 semi-
auto 
Julius 
Collier, 
Jr. 
False 
statement 
Six 3-4-91 Beretta .25 
semi-auto 
Robert 
Saunders 
False 
statement 
Seven 6-26-91 Glock 9mm. 
semi-auto 
Robert 
Saunders 
False 
statement 
Eight 7-11-91 same as 
counts 5 
and 6 
Robert 
Saunders 
Felon in 
possession 
 
3
.  All parties agree that the "stipulations [were] not binding 
upon either the Probation Department or the Court."  App. at 20.  
We further recognize that despite this stipulation, Griswold 
properly preserved for appeal his right to argue that the 1993 
guidelines should be applied so that he may gain the benefit of 
one extra point for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to § 
3E1.1.  This argument was not waived because at the time of the 
stipulation, the parties agreed that Griswold would be entitled 
to a maximum of two points for acceptance of responsibility.  The 
issue of the extra point did not arise until after the district 
court, exercising its discretion, disregarded that portion of the 
plea agreement which grouped all eight offenses as one.  See 
infra part IV.A. for discussion of the grouping of the offenses 
  
stipulated that the eight firearms offenses constituted a single 
group under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2.4 
 However, over Griswold's objection at sentencing, the 
probation office concluded and the district court agreed, that 
the application of U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2 to the eight firearms 
offenses yielded five separate groups, not a single group as the 
parties had stipulated.  As a result of the district court's 
grouping of the firearms offenses into five groups, Griswold's 
offense level was increased to 17, which would have made him 
eligible for a three-level reduction for acceptance of 
responsibility under § 3E1.1 of the 1993 guidelines.  However, 
the district court concluded that the 1990 version of § 3E1.1 was 
controlling and granted only a two-level reduction.  This appeal 
followed. 
(..continued) 
and part IV.C. for discussion of the applicability of the 1993 
guidelines. 
4
.  Both parties maintain that the plea agreement provided that 
all eight offenses would be grouped as one pursuant to § 3D1.2.  
Although the plea agreement states,"[t]he government and the 
defendant agree and stipulate that the offenses group for the 
purposes of sentencing pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2,"  App. at 
20, it does not explicitly state that all of the offenses will be 
grouped into one group.  Because such ambiguous language lends 
itself to a variety of interpretations, we believe that the 
better practice in drafting plea agreements is to explicitly 
state how many groups will be formed as a result of "grouping."  
As evidenced by the district court's decision in this matter, it 
is not always the case that grouping under § 3D1.2 will yield 
only one group. 
  
 II. JURISDICTION 
 The district court had jurisdiction to entertain this 
criminal matter pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231 insofar as the 
defendant was charged with offenses against the laws of the 
United States under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(6), 924(a), and 
922(g)(1).  Our jurisdiction is premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
(appeal from a final judgment of a district court) and 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3742(a)(2) (appeal from a final sentence). 
 
 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
  A district court's application and interpretation 
of the Sentencing Guidelines is subject to plenary review.  
United States v. Mobley, 956 F.2d 450, 451-52 (3d Cir. 1992); see 
United States v. Riviere, 924 F.2d 1289, 1304 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(construction of § 3D1.2 is a legal issue subject to plenary 
review).  However, a determination of whether various offenses 
are part of one overall scheme is essentially a factual issue 
which we review under a clearly erroneous standard.  United 
States v. Cusumano, 943 F.2d 305, 313 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. 
denied, 502 U.S. 1036, 112 S. Ct. 881 (1992) (citing United 
States v. Ortiz, 878 F.2d 125, 126-27 (3d Cir. 1989).  Finally, 
when reviewing the appropriateness of a grouping, deference must 
be given to the district court.  United States v. Seligsohn, 981 
F.2d 1418, 1426 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 115 S. 
Ct. 1143 (1995) (citing United States v. Beard, 960 F.2d 965, 969 
(11th Cir. 1992)).   
 
  
 IV. DISCUSSION 
 A.  Groups of Closely Related Counts 
 Griswold maintains that the district court erred in its 
application of the multiple count rules under § 3D1.2 of the 
Sentencing Guidelines by concluding that the eight firearms 
counts in the indictment made up five separate groups, instead of 
one group, as the parties had earlier stipulated.  Section 3D1.2 
of the 1990 United States Sentencing Guidelines stated in 
relevant part: 
 All counts involving substantially the same 
harm shall be grouped together into a single 
Group.  Counts involved substantially the 
same harm within the meaning of this rule: 
 
  . . . .  
 
 (b)  When counts involve the same victim and 
 two or more acts or transactions 
 connected by a common criminal objective 
 or constituting part of a common scheme 
 or plan. 
 
 (c)  When one of the counts embodies conduct 
 that is treated as a specific offense 
 characteristic in, or other adjustment 
 to, the guideline applicable to another 
 of the counts. 
 
 (d)  When the offense level is determined 
 largely on the basis of the total amount 
 of harm or loss, the quantity of a 
 substance involved, or some other 
 measure of aggregate harm, or if the 
 offense behavior is ongoing or 
 continuous in nature and the offense 
 guideline is written to cover such 
 behavior. 
  
U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(b)-(d) (1990).  Griswold argues that § 3D1.2(b), 
(c) and (d) each require grouping of the eight firearms offenses 
into a single group. 
 
 1.  U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(b) 
 Griswold asserts that the initial inquiry under § 
3D1.2(b) is whether the counts involve the same victim.  In the 
commentary to § 3D1.2, application note 2 indicates that, "[f]or 
offenses in which there are no identifiable victims (e.g., drug 
or immigration offenses, where society at large is the victim), 
the `victim' for purposes of subsections (a) and (b) is the 
societal interest that is harmed."  U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2, comment, 
n.2 (1993).5  Griswold concludes that the firearms offenses to 
which he pleaded guilty harmed no specific person, but rather 
offended society at large.  He notes that 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) 
(making false statements to a dealer in connection with the 
acquisition of firearms) and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (unlawful 
possession of firearms by a previously convicted felon) are part 
of a comprehensive scheme to promote the societal interest in 
combatting the criminal use of firearms by deterring sales to 
                     
5
.  As noted earlier, both parties concede and the district court 
agreed that the 1990 version of the sentencing guidelines should 
be applied in calculating Griswold's sentence.  However, as noted 
in § 1B1.11 of the sentencing guidelines, "if a court applies an 
earlier edition of the Guidelines Manual, the court shall 
consider subsequent amendments, to the extent that such 
amendments are clarifying rather than substantive changes."  
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11 (1993).  Although the commentary and 
application notes from 1990 and 1993 are substantially similar, 
we will refer to the 1993 commentary and application notes when 
it is instructive to do so.    
  
specified classes of persons, including convicted felons.  
Griswold next argues that because the societal interests 
underlying both laws are similar and because society is the 
victim, all of the offenses must be grouped together. 
 In support of his argument that § 3D1.2(b) requires all 
these offenses to be grouped into a single group, Griswold cites 
United States v. Riviere, 924 F.2d 1289 (3d Cir. 1991).  In that 
case, we were faced with the question of proper grouping as to 
three firearms-related counts which arose from the same incident 
or conduct:  possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 
illegal delivery of the same firearm, and the possession of the 
firearm with an obliterated serial number.  Id. at 1303.  In 
deciding whether these offenses should be grouped, this court 
referred to the commentary to § 3D1.2(d) of the 1990 sentencing 
guidelines which provided that sentence enhancement should not 
result from multiple counts unless they represent additional 
conduct.  Id. at 1305.  We concluded that because no additional 
conduct was represented by the additional counts, it was 
appropriate to group all of the firearms-related offenses.  Id. 
at 1306.     
 Unlike the situation present in Riviere, Griswold's 
multiple counts encompassed numerous instances of illegal conduct 
-- purchases and possession of eight semi-automatic handguns 
spanning in excess of two years.  We remain unconvinced that the 
Sentencing Commission contemplated grouping these offenses.  To 
do so would reward Griswold, who made discrete purchases of 
  
firearms over a substantial period of time, by punishing him the 
same as an offender who made one purchase. 
 Furthermore, in analyzing "the societal interest that 
is harmed," we find application note 4 to be instructive: 
 Subsection (b) provides that counts that are 
part of a single course of conduct with a 
single criminal objective and represent 
essentially one composite harm to the same 
victim are to be grouped together, even if 
they constitute legally distinct offenses 
occurring at different times.  This provision 
does not authorize the grouping of offenses 
that cannot be considered to represent 
essentially one composite harm (e.g., robbery 
of the same victim on different occasions 
involves multiple, separate instances of fear 
and risk of harm, not one composite harm) . . 
. .  The defendant is convicted of two counts 
of rape for raping the same person on 
different days.  The counts are not to be 
grouped together. 
U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2, comment, n.4 (1993) (emphasis in original).  
The Sentencing Commission, in its wisdom, saw fit to decide that 
multiple counts of rape or robbery not be grouped together when 
dealing with the same victim.  Because each time Griswold 
illegally acquired a firearm there was a separate and distinct 
fear and risk of harm to society, we hold that his illegal 
purchase of firearms on multiple occasions should not be grouped 
together.  
  
 2.  U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(c) 
 Next, Griswold argues that even assuming arguendo the 
offenses should not be grouped under § 3D1.2(b), they should be 
grouped under § 3D1.2(c).  Griswold notes that his status as a 
  
previously convicted felon is an essential element of the offense 
of possession of a firearm by a previously convicted felon and a 
factor in setting the base offense level of the counts involving 
false statements in connection with the acquisition of a firearm.  
He concludes that the counts should be grouped as one because 
"one of the counts embodies conduct that is treated as a specific 
offense characteristic in, or other adjustment to, the guideline 
applicable to another of the counts."  (quoting U.S.S.G. § 
3D1.2(c) (1990)).  However, as noted by the probation office, no 
conduct embodied in one of the counts is used as a specific 
offense characteristic in the determination of the offense level 
for another count.  Griswold's status as a convicted felon is 
implicated in establishing the base offense level for each 
offense.  However, no separate conduct by Griswold resulted in 
double counting.  Further, where there was some overlapping of 
counts, i.e., where the firearms involved in the count charging 
the defendant with illegal possession of the firearms (count 
eight) were also involved in counts charging false statements 
(counts six and seven), the court did group those counts 
together.     
 
 3.  U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d) 
 Last, Griswold contends that all of the offenses should 
be grouped together pursuant to § 3D1.2(d).  He asserts that the 
firearms offenses were "ongoing and continuous" because they were 
part of the same criminal plan, and they all involved his felon 
status as an essential element.  He refers to the commentary of § 
  
3D1.2(d) which states that "firearm offenses" are among those to 
be grouped together and points to an example which provides 
grouping for a "defendant [who] is convicted of three counts of 
unlicensed dealing in firearms."  U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2, comment, n.6 
(1993).  Griswold maintains that the multiple counts of § 
922(a)(6) and § 924(a) (making false statements in connection 
with acquisition of a firearm) to which he pled guilty should be 
grouped together just as "three counts of unlicensed dealing in 
firearms" would be grouped together pursuant to §3D1.2(d). 
 We note that the guideline stipulated to in the instant 
case, § 2K2.1 (1990),6 does not provide for multiple violations, 
nor does it provide a means of accounting for more than one 
firearm.  In contrast, § 2K2.2 (1990),7 which is specifically 
delineated as an offense that should group pursuant to subsection 
(d), makes provisions for incremental increases in offense levels 
based upon the number of firearms involved.  It is to § 2K2.2 
that the commentary speaks when it states that "most . . . 
firearms offenses, and other crimes where the guidelines are 
based primarily on quantity or contemplate continuing behavior 
are to be grouped together."  U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2, comment, n.6 
(1990).  A defendant convicted of three counts of unlicensed 
dealing in firearms (conduct covered by U.S.S.G. § 2K2.2) has 
                     
6
.  Section 2K2.1 of the 1990 U.S.S.G. deals with the "Unlawful 
Receipt, Possession, or Transportation of Firearms or 
Ammunition." 
7
.  Section 2K2.2 of the 1990 U.S.S.G. deals with "Unlawful 
Trafficking and Other Prohibited Transactions Involving 
Firearms."   
  
necessarily been punished in relation to the number of weapons 
involved, and thus grouping of the offenses would be appropriate. 
Because the guideline applicable in Griswold's case is U.S.S.G. § 
2K2.1, and not § 2K2.2, the underlying offense is not a crime 
that must be grouped pursuant to § 3D1.2(d).  Stated differently, 
multiple counts of illegal acquisition of a firearm (punishable 
under § 2K2.1) need not be grouped simply because "three counts 
of unlicensed dealing in firearms" (punishable pursuant to § 
2K2.2) must be grouped pursuant to § 3D1.2(d).8 
 
  B.  Government's Failure to Adhere to Plea Agreement 
 As an ancillary argument to his claim that the district 
court erred in failing to group the firearms offenses into one 
group, Griswold contends that "the government made what was at 
best a lukewarm endorsement of the stipulation it made as part of 
the plea agreement."9  Griswold cites United States v. Badaracco, 
                     
8
.  In the 1991 guidelines version and henceforth, the Sentencing 
Commission consolidated the 1990 version of U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1, 
2K2.2, and 2K2.3 into the newly constructed § 2K2.1.  At the same 
time, although U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 was not previously specifically 
designated as an offense subject to grouping pursuant to § 
3D1.2(d) in the 1990 guidelines, in the 1991 and later guidelines 
versions it was so specifically designated.  Thus, while 
Griswold's offenses should not be grouped pursuant to § 3D1.2(d) 
(1990), under § 3D1.2(d) (1993) the offenses must be grouped 
together.  However, even if Griswold's offenses were grouped 
under the 1993 version, his sentence would still be more than if 
he was sentenced, but not grouped, under the 1990 version.  We 
will assume that given the choice, Griswold would still opt to be 
sentenced under the 1990 guidelines.   
9
.  Griswold points to the following portion of the sentencing 
hearing to illustrate that the government did not fulfill its 
obligations under the plea agreement: 
 
  
(..continued) 
Mr. Becker:   [T]here was a guilty plea reached 
in writing where both parties, the 
Government and Mr. Griswold, agreed 
that Counts 1 through 8 of the 
indictment constitute a single 
group for purposes of application 
of this rule. 
 
 . . . .  
 
AUSA Winter:  Your Honor, the Government does 
have to concede that both counsel 
and I may have been in error in our 
stipulation as to the grouping.  
However, at the same time, the 
Government recognizes that we did 
the stipulation with the defendant 
and to some degree, if there is 
support -- albeit, a generous 
interpretation of that support -- 
if there is support for that 
interpretation, I believe the Court 
would be within its bounds to find 
the offense level in accord with 
the stipulation. 
 
  I say that because I don't think 
that the Probation Department is 
wrong in their grouping and I don't 
wish to suggest that they are.  But 
at the same time, the Government 
recognizes that groupings are a 
factor that are usually best left 
to the discretion of the trial 
court, who makes factual 
determinations and that there is, I 
guess, some room for -- for 
movement or some room for 
interpretation on how those are 
grouped. 
 
  I am in accord with the defense 
that there is an Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania opinion that does 
lend support to his argument, 
Pellowitz.  There is a distinction 
in that case from the instant case, 
that is, it involved a dealer of 
firearms, which involved a 
  
954 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1992), for the proposition that the 
government is not permitted to make statements that effectively 
undermine guidelines stipulations it enters under U.S.S.G. § 
6B1.4 as part of a plea agreement.  In that case, the government 
stipulated that the defendant's conduct did not involve more than 
minimal planning.  The probation office, however, found that the 
defendant's offense did involve more than minimal planning and 
recommended a two point enhancement in the base offense level, to 
which the district court agreed.  Id. at 938-39.  On appeal, the 
defendant argued that statements made by the government at 
(..continued) 
different guidelines section and, 
in fact, one that is specifically 
included in 3D1.2 Group D for 
grouping, whereas the guideline in 
this offense was not specifically 
included in Section D of 3D1.2. 
 
  I guess I don't want to -- I guess 
I'm trying to be very frank with 
the Court, because I am requesting 
an upward departure of the 
defendant and the Government does 
not wish to seem unseemly and seize 
upon any opportunity to justify a 
higher level by first agreeing to 
stipulate with the defendant and 
then turn around and say, you know 
what, I was wrong and you're -- and 
you're stuck with a higher 
guidelines level and I'm going to 
upwardly depart.  I -- I want to be 
fair to the defendant and in -- in 
bending over backwards to be fair 
and giving a very generous 
interpretation to this, I think the 
Court could find all of the 
grouping. 
 
App. at 26-28 (emphasis added).  
  
sentencing were violative of the plea agreement because the 
government's conduct was inconsistent with what he understood 
when entering the plea of guilty.  Id. at 939.  We concluded 
that: 
 The comment by the attorney for the 
government that "there was an affirmative 
step taken by [the defendant] indicating that 
he was concealing something" provided the 
district court with a basis to reject the 
government's stipulation in its plea 
agreement and to adopt the probation 
department's recommendation that there was 
more than minimal planning by [the 
defendant].  We therefore agree with [the 
defendant] that the government violated the 
spirit, if not the letter, of the plea 
agreement. 
Id. at 940 (footnote omitted).   
 In the case before us, the government was not trying to 
urge the district court to adopt the recommendation of the 
probation office.  Quite the contrary, the government was simply 
pointing up to the court an obvious conflict which existed 
between the plea agreement and the probation report, and 
explaining to the court why it would be "within its bounds to 
find the offense level in accord with the stipulation" in the 
plea agreement.  Because we conclude that Badaracco is 
distinguishable and we find that the government's conduct at 
sentencing was not inconsistent with the terms of the plea 
agreement, we will not remand this case for resentencing.    
 Additionally, Griswold argues that the government on 
appeal has totally repudiated the stipulation upon which he 
relied in entering the plea agreement.  However, we note that the 
  
plea agreement specifically provided that, "[n]othing in this 
agreement shall limit the government in its comments in, and 
responses to, any post-sentencing matters."  App. at 18.  Thus, 
the government did not act contrary to the plea agreement when, 
on appeal, it argued that the district court did not err in 
grouping the offenses into five separate groups.10    
 
  C.  The "One Book Rule" 
 As part of the calculation of Griswold's sentence, the 
district court granted the two-level reduction for acceptance of 
responsibility available under the 1990 guidelines.  See U.S.S.G. 
§ 3E1.1(a) (1990).  Griswold now argues that the district court 
erred because it did not grant him a three-level downward 
adjustment -- the maximum reduction available for acceptance of 
responsibility under the 1993 version of the guidelines.  Section 
1B1.11 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines states in 
relevant part: 
                     
10
.  Additionally, the government reserved its right to argue 
contrary to the stipulation on appeal: 
 
AUSA Winter: Your honor, I just want to note for 
the record that by conceding that 
the defense's argument on the 
grouping issue had some merit, the 
Government is not waiving its right 
to argue subsequently on appeal, 
that your Honor was not in error by 
grouping as you did.  I simply 
wanted to state that for the 
record. 
 
App. at 119. 
  
 (a)  The court shall use the Guidelines 
Manual in effect on the date that 
the defendant is sentenced. 
 
 (b)(1)  If the court determines that use of 
the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date 
that the defendant is sentenced would violate 
the ex post facto clause of the United States 
Constitution, the court shall use the 
Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that 
the offense of conviction was committed. 
 
    (2)  The Guidelines Manual in effect on a 
particular date shall be applied in its 
entirety.  The court shall not apply, for 
example, one guideline section from one 
edition of the Guidelines Manual and another 
guideline section from a different edition of 
the Guidelines Manual.  However, if a court 
applies an earlier edition of the Guidelines 
Manual, the court shall consider subsequent 
amendments, to the extent that such 
amendments are clarifying rather than 
substantive changes. 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11 (1993).  Thus, Griswold maintains that the 
district court violated the mandate of § 1B1.11(a) which requires 
application of the 1993 guidelines.  However, because the use of 
the § 2K2.1 would violate the ex post facto clause, the district 
court applied the 1990 guidelines and then chose to follow § 
1B1.11(b)(2) when calculating the number of points for acceptance 
of responsibility under § 3E1.1.11 
 The question before the court is whether § 1B1.11(b)(2) 
(the "one book rule") supersedes § 1B1.11(a) (use guidelines 
effective on the date of sentencing) when the court is forced 
                     
11
.  As indicated above, § 1B1.11(b)(2) requires that only one 
guideline manual should be applied to any given sentencing.  This 
rule has become known in sentencing guidelines parlance as the 
"one book rule." 
  
because of ex post facto reasons to use an earlier version of the 
guidelines.  Quite recently, in United States v. Corrado, __ F.3d 
__, No. 93-2086, 1995 WL 262608 (3d Cir. May 8, 1995), we had the 
opportunity to decide this very issue.  In adopting the "one book 
rule" and bringing the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in 
conformity with the majority of other courts of appeals, we held: 
 [§ 1B1.11(b)(2)] expressly prohibits district 
courts from doing precisely what [the 
defendant] suggests the district court here 
should have done -- namely, to mix and match 
provisions from different versions of the 
guidelines in order to tailor a more 
favorable sentence.  Because of its 
prohibitive nature, as well as the fact that 
we believe applying various provisions taken 
from different versions of the guidelines 
would upset the coherency and balance the 
Sentencing Commission obviously intended in 
promulgating the guidelines, we conclude that 
section § 1B1.11(b)(2) is binding and, as 
such, was properly followed by the district 
court in this case.        
Corrado, 1994 WL 262608, at *2 (citation omitted).  Because 
Corrado is directly on point, we will affirm the district court's 
application of the "one book rule." 
 
 V.  CONCLUSION 
 We conclude that the district court did not err in 
applying and interpreting the Sentencing Guidelines, and we will 
affirm the sentence of Griswold in all respects. 
                         
 
 
  
 
